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Of Batcaves and Clock-towers: Living
Damaged Lives in Gotham City
James B. South
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI
“My parents taught me a different lesson…. Lying on this
street—shaking in deep shock—dying for no reason at
all—they showed me that the world only makes sense
when you force it to.” Bruce Wayne in Batman: The
Dark Knight Returns1
“I made a promise to my parents that I would rid the city of the evil that took
their lives.”
Bruce Wayne in Batman: Dark Victory2

In Darwyn Cooke’s Batman: Ego, we are given an account of a
young Bruce Wayne’s Christmas day and evening. The day starts
nicely enough with gifts, family cheer, and Bruce’s excitement over his
new Zorro action figure. However, at Christmas dinner, Bruce’s father,
Dr. Thomas Wayne, receives a phone call updating him on a patient’s
health. He decides he must go visit the patient and has Bruce ride
along with him. The patient dies and as Dr. Wayne is covering the
body, Bruce walks into the room and sees the dead body. Back in the
car, Bruce expresses his confusion following his first experience with
death, and the following exchange occurs:
BRUCE: Are you and mom going to die?
DR. WAYNE: Well, yes we will, Bruce. Everyone passes on. But
not before our time. And that’s a long way away.
BRUCE: Promise?
DR. WAYNE: I promise son.3
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The sequel to this part of the story is well known: a few weeks later
the Wayne family goes to a movie and, after the show, Dr. and Mrs.
Wayne are shot and killed by a robber leaving Bruce an orphan. Dr.
Wayne was unable to keep his promise. This story points out the fact
that promises are remarkably fragile human actions: ones made to
specific people in particular circumstances, and which envision a future
that may or may not come to pass. So, for example, one need only
think about the high divorce rates in western industrialized societies to
recognize how ‘utopian’ promises can be and how recalcitrant reality
can be in knocking down the future envisioned by promises.
In this essay, I want to try to juxtapose the stories told by some
comic books, those set in Gotham City and involving Batman, Batgirl,
and Catwoman, with issues raised by this fragility intrinsic to promises.
I want to argue that these comic books provide us with an image of
what I will call, following J. M. Bernstein, “fugitive ethics,” that is, a
kind of ethical action of which promises are paradigmatic.4 While a
positive description of what such ethical actions are will be available at
the end of this essay, for now it is sufficient to note two of their central
features. First, fugitive ethical actions are actions that are available to
us only under the conditions of late modern capitalism. As a result,
fugitive ethical actions are ethical actions that are available to lives
that are best characterized as damaged in a sense still to be specified.
In what follows, I first characterize the understanding of modernism
relevant for my discussion, and then proceed to consider the ways in
which lives lived under the conditions of modernism can be called
damaged. After that, I will turn to a more extensive description of
fugitive ethics. Throughout this essay, I am providing an approach to
the relation between philosophy and popular culture, one that points to
a very close convergence of the aims certain forms of philosophy
possess and those aims certain forms of popular culture possess.
I need to offer one methodological consideration before
proceeding. Umberto Eco has talked about the dream-like quality of
superhero comic books, referring to the fact that there is always
something more to be said with each new issue, while, nonetheless,
‘before’ and ‘after’ remain hazy.5 There is a kind of eternal present
involved in the experience of reading comic books. This makes talk
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about ‘continuity’ between comic books very difficult. Geoff Klock has
extended Eco’s insight about comic book continuity by pointing to the
way that “strong work comes to define truth.”6 In other words, certain
comic books within a series tend to take on additional weight due to a
variety of factors such as their especially high quality, their
disproportionate influence on subsequent issues in the series, and their
reception as canonical for a series. Many of the comics I discuss below
have managed to attain to this level of strong work as generally
recognized by the community of comic book writers, artists, and
readers. Without disputing the account of strong works within a series,
I would add this point: what constitutes strong work can be indexed to
the concerns the reader brings to the texts. Thus, I have chosen these
comics in part because they help illustrate my point, in part because
they are generally recognized as among the best recent work in
comics, and in part because of my experience of them. In Eco’s
dream-like world of the history of comics, I am certain I could have
found other books to illustrate my argument, just as I am sure there
are comic books that point in a direction I do not follow here. More
importantly, though, the comics I discuss here are comics that have
made a strong impression on me, that have come to define a ‘truth’
for me about the universe in which these comics take place and the
light that universe sheds on our universe.7 Yet, while the selection of
comics to be discussed is thus ineluctably personal, that fact does not
make the conclusion I want to draw idiosyncratic, though I recognize
that as a promise to the reader that I can hope to fulfill only by
providing the following discussion.

I: Gotham City and Modernism
At the beginning of Batman: Year One (Miller, et al., 1987), we
see Lieutenant James Gordon, newly appointed to the Gotham City
Police Department, arriving in the city via train. Paralleling his arrival,
we see the return of Bruce Wayne via airplane to Gotham City after an
absence of twelve years. Gordon’s arrival is drawn in black and white—
grey sky, grey train; it’s all wires, bridges, trestles, and train tracks.
His internal thoughts in this first panel: “Gotham City. Maybe it’s all I
deserve now. Maybe it’s just my time in Hell.” In the second panel, we
see the interior of the train: it’s overcrowded, people standing in the
aisle, luggage weighing down the caging that is overhead. Gordon
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continues: “Train’s no way to come to Gotham…in an airplane from
above, all you’d see are the streets and buildings. Fool you into
thinking it’s civilized.” When we see Bruce Wayne, it’s from outside his
plane. We see him as if he were alone without any of the overcrowding
of the train. His thoughts: “From here, it’s clean shafts of concrete and
snowy rooftops. The work of men who died generations ago. From
here, it looks like an achievement. I should have taken the train. I
should be closer. I should see the enemy.”8
I now want to develop a conceptual apparatus that will help us
to understand these two scenes and that will set the stage for a
discussion of life in Gotham City. I begin with a definition of
modernism. Since any such definition is likely to be contentious, I
simply want to stipulate one for purposes of discussion, though it is
one with which I agree. I borrow the description of modernism from
John Patrick Diggins:
What, specifically, is modernism? As a way of reacting to the
modern world, modernism is the consciousness of what once
was presumed to be present and is now seen as missing. It
might be considered as a series of felt absences, the gap
between what we know is not and what we desire to be:
knowledge without truth, power without authority, society
without spirit, self without identity, politics without virtue,
existence without purpose, history without meaning.9
There are two aspects to this account of modernism that I want
to emphasize. First, Diggins mentions a series of absences that cluster
around the fact that meanings previously available to human beings
are no longer available. One characteristic way of discussing these
absences is by talking about the “disenchantment of the world.”10 As
we shall see, the traditional resources for moral evaluation and
commitment are among the most prominent of our losses and foster
our disenchantment in a particularly significant manner. Second, while
Diggins does not try to provide any content for the rather neutral term
“feeling” it seems worthwhile to have at our disposal a thicker, more
descriptive, understanding of the feeling generated by the absence of
meaning. In fact, Diggins subsequently speaks of the “intellectual
wounds of modernity,” and I want to draw attention to that phrase.11
Certainly, ‘wound,’ conveys content considerably less neutral than
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“feeling,” and it seems right that the feeling engendered by the
disenchantment of the world be characterized by this richer, less
neutral, term. Moreover, this richer term begins to provide us with
some sense of what is at stake in modernist understandings of our
predicament.
For his part, Bernstein has delineated the ways that the good
life as traditionally understood is no longer possible for us under the
conditions of modernism. On his account, our lives as we currently live
them are damaged.12 There are two situations that stand behind this
claim, one having to do with the social conditions in which we must
live, the other having to do with the way in which the scope of ethical
action has been increasingly “privatized.” The foundational description
of the social conditions under which we must live our lives privileges
Weber’s concept of rationalization, and the most obvious success story
of rationalization is science. Science is masterfully effective and
successful, and this effectiveness bestows on science an aura of
authority. The success of science breeds more success until, finally, we
come to believe that anything can be understood in principle, that is,
that “we can master all things by calculation.”13 This rationalization
process is a key factor in the disenchantment of the world so keenly
described in modernist thought. The second situation leading to
damaged lives is Weber’s famous “bureaucratization” thesis wherein
social relations are rendered calculable in accord with the ruling ethos
of science. Under this condition, no social relation remains
uncontaminated by considerations of efficiency, calculation, and the
like. Indeed, these considerations concerning efficiency coupled with
the disenchantment of the world account for Weber’s description of the
“iron cage” of rationality that ensnares us all, warping our experience
of the world and trapping us in a set of social relations that can only
be described as ‘wounding.’14 Given this understanding of
disenchantment, it makes perfect sense for James Gordon to express
skepticism towards the idea that Gotham City is “civilized,” and perfect
sense for Bruce Wayne to view the city as “the enemy.”

II: Damaged Life
If Gotham City can be viewed as representing a rationalized
world—one that wounds—then it should follow that its inhabitants are
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leading damaged lives. How, though, can we best represent the notion
of a damaged life? Bernstein presents a compelling framework for this
task by focusing on what he calls ‘affective skepticism’: “…a systematic
separation between the rational and universalistic norms of a
rationalized practice, on the one hand, and the concrete, unique
agent-specific motivation for pursuing that practice on the other.”15 In
Alan Moore’s famous Batman: The Killing Joke16, we can see a
representation of such affective skepticism.
This comic gives us an origin story for the Joker, one of
Batman’s most famous foes. In a series of flashbacks, we learn that
the Joker, whose real name we never learn in the comic, was a down
on his luck would-be stand-up comedian before the series of events
that turned him into the Joker. He was married, and there was a child
on the way; he had left a “good job” as a lab assistant at a chemical
plant in order to pursue his dream of becoming a comedian; and he
was thus forced to prove himself as a husband and father. To try to
provide for his family, he has involved himself with a couple of low
level criminals who are planning to rob a playing card company. The
most direct access to the Playing Card company is through the
chemical plant where the future Joker once worked. On the day of the
robbery, the future Joker is told that his wife had a fatal accident at
home. His two criminal cohorts force him to continue his part in the
robbery. When the robbery goes wrong, his two cohorts are shot by
the police. At that moment, Batman arrives, has the cops stop
shooting, and goes in pursuit of the soon-to-be Joker. Batman pursues
him until his only possible escape is to jump into a vat of chemicals.
When he is flushed out of the vat into a sewer away from the plant,
thereby escaping Batman, he discovers the chemicals have left him
permanently disfigured: his skin white, his hair green, and his face
permanently disfigured. This “one bad day” creates the Joker. The
conjunction of his disastrous attempt to prove himself and the
accidental death of his wife is more than he can take. He describes the
result of this one bad day: “When I saw what a black, awful joke the
world was, I went crazy as a coot.”
The idea of proving something recurs in the Joker’s criminal plan
unfolding in the book’s present, with equally disastrous results. His
plan is to prove to Batman that he and Batman are no different—
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indeed, that any person is simply a series of bad events away from
craziness. This radical contingency is continually represented by
imagery of cards and card playing, especially the joker card—what
happens to us, it seems, is accidental. Without some master narrative
to tell ourselves about the world and its sense, there simply is no
sense; and The Joker has lost any narrative that could make the world
sensible. The Joker mocks Batman in their final confrontation in an
abandoned amusement park: “You have to keep pretending that life
makes sense, that there’s some point to all the struggling.”17 Before
arriving at this final point, he had gone to Commissioner Gordon’s
apartment, shot his daughter Barbara, stripped Barbara of her clothes
as she lay paralyzed on the floor, took pictures of her, and kidnapped
the commissioner. Later in the abandoned amusement park, he
tortures Gordon and shows him pictures of his naked, helpless
daughter in an attempt to drive him mad, thereby proving his point
that we’re all just one bad day away from insanity. When Batman
arrives at the park, he discovers that Gordon has not gone crazy, that,
indeed, Gordon is determined the Joker be brought in “by the book” to
“show him that our way works.” Batman confronts the Joker, who
argues his case: “It’s all a joke. Everything anybody ever valued or
struggled for. It’s all a monstrous demented gag. So why can’t you see
the funny side? Why aren’t you laughing?” Batman responds: “Because
I’ve heard it before and it wasn’t funny the first time.”18 Once
defeated, the Joker, former failed stand-up comic, tells a joke to
explain why he can never let Batman help him:
See, there are these two guys in a lunatic asylum…and one
night, they decide they don’t like living in an asylum anymore.
They decide they’re going to escape! So, like, they get up onto
the roof. And there, just across this narrow gap, they see the
rooftops of the town, stretching away in the moonlight.
Stretching away to freedom. Now, the first guy, he jumps right
across with no problem. But his friend, his friend daren’t make
the leap. Y’see…y’see he’s afraid of falling. So then the first guy
has an idea…he says, “Hey! I have my flashlight with me! I’ll
shine it across the gap between the buildings. You can walk
along the beam and join me!” B-but the second guy just shakes
his head. He suh-says…he says, “Wh-what do you think I am?
Crazy? You’d turn it off when I was halfway across.”19
The comic ends with both The Joker and Batman laughing at this joke.
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It is clear that The Joker has succumbed to affective skepticism
on a rather massive scale. If it makes sense to say that there can be a
coherence in madness—and Joker’s perfectly “rational” plan to prove
that everyone is “one bad day” away from being like him certainly
seems coherent—then the only motive he has for acting comes from
features internal to his madness. And yet the proof he’s offering bears
all the hallmarks of an experiment. The Joker may be mad, but he
understands and accepts the rudiments of rationalized thought. More
formally, The Joker has lost touch with any values external to his
practice, as is evident from his willingness to kill, wound, and torture
people in an effort to prove his point. As an interpretation of the joke
at the end of the story, I read the asylum as representing the
disenchanted world that we all live in as a result of rationalization and
bureaucratization. The challenge we face can be summed up nicely by
recognizing that while it is possible to escape the asylum by various
forms of flight, those forms are at the same time remarkably unstable
strategies. The fear of falling is real, but the strategies available to us
in a rationalized, disenchanted world are only various forms of fantasy,
about as stable as a flashlight’s beam.
One concrete way that Bernstein shows the damage done to us
in our living lives under the conditions of modernism argument
involves the debate between internalists and externalists in moral
theory20 In brief, externalists hold that justifying reasons for moral
actions and motivating reasons for such actions are in principle distinct
while internalists hold that they ought to converge. The externalist will
try to justify a moral norm by appealing to abstract principles that
are universally applicable in an attempt to show that a) such moral
norms apply to everyone and that b) they transcend self-interest.
Thus, in condemning theft, the externalist might provide reasons that
work on an abstract level, say, respect for property or maximization of
the greatest happiness for the greatest number, but still leave me
wondering why I should not steal. Part of the problem here is that, as
Bernstein points out, any such justification aimed at everyone is likely
to be “agent neutral;” but if the reason is not compelling to an agent,
it need not be compelling to me. Moreover, it is simply part of our
intuitive notion of morality that it should provide reasons that go
beyond what may currently motivate me to act. Thus, the argument
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against theft should work even for those who are inclined to steal; but,
again, that means there will be a disconnect between the set of beliefs
and desires that motivate me to steal and the argument against
stealing. It is difficult to see how to connect those two sets of reasons.
Internalists argue that the only way to do so is by rejecting the
externality of justificatory reasons. That is, any reason for action must
be one that motivates me from the inside, as it were.
A standard objection to such a view is that any reason that is
internally motivating to me must be one I can already accept, thus
limiting my moral point of view to that sphere within which I have
comfort, or, to put it another way, all my moral reasons would be ones
that do not challenge me. The potential for a self-satisfied morality is
all too clear. Bernstein’s move, at this point, is very interesting. He
essentially denies that there’s any substantive moral difference
between these two views, pointing out that pretty much any set of
external reasons can be internalized:
The fundamental objection to externalist theories, which in fact
supports the claim that they are external, is not that they
cannot in principle be incorporated into individuals’ motivational
sets (almost anything can) but that they are representative and
functional components of a generalised experience of
disenchantment and societal rationalisation that hurts.21
In other words, internalism as a position in moral theory is best
viewed not as a theoretical demand, but as an expressive response to
the disenchantment brought about by rationalization, a response that
is necessary because the gap between motivational reasons and
justifying reasons hurts us as we try to make our way through the
world in morally responsive ways.
Given this experience of hurt, which is manifested
philosophically in moral theory as a need for justificatory and
motivational reasons to converge, it might be useful to think about
responses to this experience of hurt. Bernstein mentions several
expressions of this hurt brought about by disenchantment. Direct
expressions of the pain we feel include disillusionment, alienation,
boredom, and anger, while indirect expressions of this hurt manifest
themselves in cynicism, focusing on one part of life in an attempt to
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make the whole meaningful, religious fundamentalism, obsessive
consumerism, and a valuing of pure experience of an erotic or
aesthetic sort (Bernstein 2004, 19-20). Returning to Batman: Year
One, it is worth noting what we see in the panels immediately
following the ones that introduce us to Gordan and Wayne: Gordon is
accosted by a religious cultist as he’s getting off the train, while
Wayne, the rich, single playboy is accosted at the airport by television
reporters. Here we see two of the most obvious forms of flight
associated with the hurt of modern rationalized society: religious
fundamentalism and an obsession with life-style.
Even if, we can view Gotham City and its problems as the work
of disenchanted reason, a further question remains. Why does
scientific thought result in a disenchanted world? The answer to that
question comes down to the fact that the overwhelming tendency of
reason is to advance what Bernstein calls “identity thinking.” The
central feature of such thinking involves subsuming particulars under
universals, where universals have the function of simplifying, making
coherent, explaining, and unifying particulars. The dangers here are
pretty obvious, since particulars are always richer than the universal
under which they are subsumed. That is, universals, whether they take
the form of concept terms or scientific explanations, leave out
something about the particular that resists unification and identity.22
Two items may be identical as they fall under a universal, but they are
not identical as particulars. The tension, then, turns on whether one
wants to criticize scientific rationalism for its omission of the relevant
non-identity characteristics of items, or accept science and lose the
particular characteristics. Obviously, criticizing scientific rationalism is
a risky act. If you focus, for example, on the way in which scientific
rationalism has some non-rational foundation—a focus central to much
twentieth century philosophy from Heidegger to Kuhn—you simply fail
to close the gap between justificatory and motivational reasons for
acting. So, for example, if you want to say that the legitimacy of
science rests on some historical accident, or the way in which it is
inextricably tied to a discredited onto-theology, then motivational
reasons will be reasons, but ultimately irrational. That is, the two sorts
of reasons are not connected. But if that is the case, then motivating
reasons are still subject to criticism from reason, that is, affective
skepticism still looms as a likely result.23 Of course, the other
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possibility that awaits is Joker-like: simply accepting the irrationality.
Batman may laugh at the Joker’s joke, but it is clear that he is the one
who has jumped across the gap between the asylum and the world.
How might he have done this, and, more importantly, how might he
have done this while not giving into madness?
One possible response canvassed by Bernstein is that we may
criticize rationality not because it is rational, but because it is not
rational enough:
Only an expansion of reason, rationality, and cognition will
answer the dilemma of disenchantment; and if this expansion is
to be keyed to the diagnosis of scientific rationalism as a
process of systematically negating particularity in favor of
universality (the movement of rationalization as identity
thinking), then the direction of expansion will be the inclusion in
reasoning of ineliminable moments of dependency and
particularity.24
The features of dependence and particularity are crucial. By making
reason recognize the contours of the world in ways that block identity
thinking, it might be possible to rescue the intrinsic rationality of
motivating reasons, that is, it might be possible to connect justification
and motivation. However, the generality of this suggestion is
problematic. What we need are examples of “ineliminable moments of
dependency and particularity.” One place to find such examples is by
considering human actions that are irreducible to general principles
and their application. The practice of promising is one such type of
action.

III-Promises, Promises
In Batgirl: Year One25, we find out how Barbara Gordon
becomes Batgirl (this is the same Barbara Gordon who, after retiring
from her duties as Batgirl is shot by The Joker). She is a successful,
very bright young adult who is living a very unsatisfying (to her) life as
a librarian. Her days behind a bank of computers at the library are
hounded by a paralyzing tedium. She is misperceived routinely by
others, that is, others are failing to see her particularity by their focus
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on her job, or her height, or even her status as daughter. She tries
several ways to break out of her constrained life—she applies to the
police academy and the FBI—but is rejected by both. She is looking for
“anything that will get me out of where I am. Where I don’t want to
be.”26 For a costume party, she decides to go wearing a female
variation on a Batman costume. By the end of the evening, she’s been
dubbed “Batgirl” and has come to the attention of Batman. When
asked why she wants to be a costumed crime fighter, she responds:
“You may have all the tools of the trade, but you don’t have a
monopoly on wanting to help. I’ll tell you why, you big scary goon.
Because I can.” And she immediately adds: “I can see Gotham’s
future. And without people like you and pixie boots and me, this place
doesn’t have much to look forward to.”27
On the surface, this portrayal of Barbara Gordon’s motivation for
becoming Batgirl would seem to contrast starkly with Bruce Wayne’s
story. When young Bruce Wayne saw his parents brutally murdered by
a robber, he promised that he would rid Gotham City of such evil. For
a long time, he saw this as a necessity forced upon him; something
about which he had no choice. In his internalization of such an
external demand, Bruce Wayne is the very embodiment of the damage
done by a disenchanted world. Eventually, though, he came to see it
as a choice he made: “I thought I didn’t have a choice about being the
Batman. That Gotham City chose me to protect her. That is wrong.
Ever since the night my parents were taken from me, I made the
choice. It is a good choice.”28 The circumstances under which Bruce
Wayne came to see that he had made a choice involved the
renunciation of a chance at a romantic relationship. In denying
one future, he claims the present and its future for himself. In short, I
think there is a nice parallel here between the choice Barbara Gordon
makes (“Because I can”) and the choice Bruce Wayne makes. Why I
think this is significant will take a bit of working out, but will involve
two points, one having to do with the purely human status of Bruce
Wayne and Barbara Gordon, while the other has to do with the
intension of the word “can” in Barbara Gordon’s motivation for her
decision.
One way into the first issue is to ask why it is that Bruce Wayne
and Barbara Gordon choose to help in the way that they do. After all,
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they have no superpowers, but are purely human. That is, it’s not the
case that by their very nature they somehow cannot fit into standard
roles and practices. Bruce Wayne could become, say, a policeman. His
choice to protect Gotham City takes, let’s face it, a pretty counterintuitive and bizarre form: dressing up like a bat and working outside
normal legal channels. So too in the case of Barbara Gordon: why this
choice and not some other? If we remember the context of their
choices—living damaged lives in a disenchanted world—it is easier to
see what might be going on. In addition, we must keep in mind the
ineliminable particularity of Bruce and Barbara as agents. While the
police can protect and serve, and while policemen can be honest and
trustworthy—although the Batman comics give us many examples of
corrupt cops—nonetheless, the police, indeed, the entire set of justice
institutions, are complicit in the rationalized, disenchanted world that
is Gotham City. If Batman were a policeman, he would be doing little
more than offering consolation to the citizens of Gotham City, when
what they need is the promise of something more, the promise of
some sort of experience that is not deformed by disenchantment and
that holds out some promise for hope. In a crime-ridden and corrupt
city such as Gotham City, it is clear that traditional authority has
lost its luster; what else could be expected in a disenchanted world?
As we saw Diggins point out, the absence of authority and its
replacement with power is a basic condition of modernity. Thus, what
the disenchanted world needs is the re-establishment of authority
without its juridicolegal context, which would render that authority
prey to skeptical reason. Batman and Batgirl can be seen as sources of
authority precisely by the choices they make that set them outside the
legal context.
But there is another lesson, I think, that can be learned from
Barbara Gordon’s story. After all, she becomes someone with not only
one superhero identity, but two. Batgirl: Year One tells the story of
Barbara’s becoming Batgirl, but also points to her future, one that she
has no way of perceiving at the time of Batgirl: Year One. The reader
knows that Barbara Gordon both is and is not “divining” her future in
her taking on the persona of Batgirl. In the dream-like world of comic
continuity, the Batgirl who comes to be now also is the Batgirl who is
shot and permanently paralyzed by the Joker in The Killing Joke and
later emerges as Oracle, information gatherer and crime fighter, She
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even becomes a lead character in her own comic series Birds of Prey.
While Barbara may not know her future, the book is filled with
references to it. She starts by talking about the nature of Cassandra’s
oracles, portending a future that she was powerless to have an effect
on. In trying to anticipate her own future, Barbara states: “I have to
find another path. Divine my own future. One uniquely mine. Not a
page from someone else’s book. Not a fate that begins and ends on
page one… To dad, I’m all talk about digging for information. I won’t
be some glorified “answer lady” for the cops. I want to be in on the
action. Anything that will get me out of where I am. Where I don’t
want to be” (Beatty, et al., 12-13). In the very panel in which Barbara
expresses her desire to be anywhere but where she is, we see her
sitting behind computers in the library, looking out through a window
in a scene that clearly calls to mind her bank of computers in the clock
tower where she lives and operates as Oracle.
One way to understand a promise is to recognize it as consisting
of three elements: a) it takes place in the present and its context; b) it
imagines a future that is not imaginable from the present except by
the very fulfillment of the promise; and c) it is powerless in relation to
what might happen in the future (Bernstein 2004, 436). In Barbara’
Gordon’s story, we have the very nature of a promise playing out in
front of us. Her promise (“Because I can”) does in fact take place in
the present, imagines a future (one in which she helps), and is
nonetheless powerless in relation to what reality, in the form of the
Joker, has to offer. The fragility of promising is made concrete in the
fragility of Barbara Gordon in the face of the Joker’s bullet. Her
“because I can” thus doubly represents “hopefulness in the teeth of
intransigent reality” (Bernstein 2004, 436). Her promise to become
Batgirl is at the very same time her promise to find ways of keeping
that promise when the promise has been thwarted by reality. Within
her promise to be Batgirl, her promise to be Oracle is inscribed as well.
Both the nobility of the promise and its fragility are held up for the
reader’s inspection.29

IV-Fugitive Ethics
Bernstein plausibly argues that the only way authority can be
experienced is on the back of fugitive ethical acts: “Certain empirical
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events have the status of both actualizing a possibility and in so doing
making a promise about the future…. Since such events both flee from
ordinary empirical experience and are intrinsically ephemeral and
transient, I consider them “fugitives””30 That is, what would give
Batman and Batgirl authority, as opposed to the power of the police, is
precisely the way in which their actions embody a fugitive character,
one that is represented concretely by their working outside the law,
but can be philosophically explicated in the convergence of motivating
and justifying reasons.31 This convergence manifests itself in their
promising. In considering one more example from the Batman
universe, I hope to tie together all the threads of my discussion.
Consider Selina Kyle, the once and future Catwoman. In Darwyn
Cooke’s Selina’s Big Score32, we see Selina trying to pick up the pieces
of a life that had spiraled out of control, leaving her no choice but to
fake her own death. On returning to Gotham City, she meets Chantel,
the girlfriend of a mobster named Falcone. Chantel has overheard
Falcone talking about a big chunk of money and she wants Selina to
help her “to rip these fools off.”33 After some questioning by Selina,
her motives become clear:
Me? I know who I am…what I am. I’m not ashamed of it, right?
‘Cause when it’s time, everybody does what they have to to get
over. I look at you and I know you hear what I’m sayin’. You
spent some time at it, but you got clear—and that’s what I
want…to get clear…clear of this pig Falcone. I want to erase
every sickening thing I’ve had to do to hold it together. I could
feed you a pile about my kid, but that’s none of your nevermind.
I could blubber about my old sick mama and get all country and
western on your ass, but the stone truth is it’s me. I’m sick of it.
Like I’d rather die, right? So maybe by doing one more really
bad thing I can make something good happen. For me, for my
little girl. I’m not talking about right or wrong. I’m talking about
basic human dignity.34
These words remind Selina of a time when they were spoken to her.
Over the course of the book, which inaugurated a new Catwoman
comic series, Selina commits to a new sort of life while trying to
understand the idea of basic human dignity. While this new life is not
one of conventional morality, to be sure, it is one committed to helping
others, especially those in the East End of Gotham City. When she
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returns to Gotham City after killing off her Catwoman persona, she has
a particularly harrowing adventure capturing a man who had been
killing hookers. It is then that she’s able to reclaim her Catwoman
persona, but for a different purpose. Her words:
For a long time, all I could think about was pain—my own and
my family’s. And that pain defined who I was, and ultimately
just caused more until there was nothing left for me beyond
that. But today I’m not thinking about the crooked cops and
politicians. I’m not thinking about the wife-beaters and rapists,
the mobsters. I’ll get to them eventually. No, right now, all I can
think about is how good I’m going to feel when that sun goes
down. And you can’t argue with happiness, can you?35
What is so compelling about Selina’s story is that it provides a perfect
representation of a disenchanted, damaging world in which the major
ethical feat available to humans is not being crushed by others. At the
same time, these passages and their accompanying images promise
the realization that while futures may be grim and lives may be
damaged, moments of true happiness are possible and moments of
genuine ethical acting are available. As Bernstein states, “The
world is disenchanted, but it is not utterly closed in on itself: there are
moments of happiness (and not just pleasure or illusory happiness),
and there are the fragmented and heterogeneous that do not fit with
the course of the world.”36
Indeed, I think it striking that despite the difficult and damaged
lives led by Bruce Wayne, Barbara Gordon, and Selina Kyle, one of the
most notable features of the comics I’m talking about concerns their
happiness. In almost every book, this happiness takes a specific form:
the characters fly through the air, literally defying gravity. The
expression of freedom on their faces and the joyousness of their flight
are repeatedly depicted in the face of the monstrous and irrational
crimes they see enacted and try to prevent. Fugitive ethical acts are
acts that can cause happiness in otherwise damaged lives. Yet at the
same time, there are reminders that the happiness and the acts that
cause it exact a price. The price is most visible in the fact that none of
them maintains a long-standing relationship; they have given up the
usual forms of private satisfaction. Also, it is notable that none of them
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live in ordinary places: Batman spends more time in his cave than in
Bruce Wayne’s mansion; Selina lives at the top of an abandoned
tenement in Gotham City’s seedy East End, and Barbara Gordon, no
longer Batgirl after being shot and paralyzed by the Joker, now lives in
a clock tower where she helps Batman and others as Oracle. But, of
course, this graphical depiction of happiness is just that—a graphical
depiction of the happiness that results from doing what is in accord
with “basic human dignity,” or to put it another way, the experience of
having one’s motivational and justificatory reasons coincide, or, to put
it another way, by making a promise—“because I can.”
By way of conclusion, I will point out a lesson this essay
discloses. I’ve shown that the lives of Bruce Wayne, Barbara Gordon,
and Selina Kyle, as graphically represented in some comic books, are
representation of lives led in possibility, a possibility that transcends
current practices. Thus, while their lives are represented as lived under
the conditions of modernism, with all the damage and hurt entailed by
those conditions, they also are represented as exemplifications of
promise; exemplifications of the possibility of fugitive ethical acts.
While recognizing the fictional nature of these characters, and the
problems of continuity, what remains from my reading of these books
is the claim that these characters’ actions are revelatory of an
experience of possibility. Of course, on one understanding of
philosophy, the revelation and explication of this experience of
possibility is also one of philosophy’s tasks.37 Indeed, in a
disenchanted world, the representation of these possibilities in popular
culture may be one of few chances for us to view them in a thematic
and not merely fugitive manner. Yet the very oddity of the medium’s
characters—superheroes—reinforces how out of the ordinary such
experiences are these days. And while the characters in Batman
related comics are not represented as explicating this experience of
possibility, they can be read as revealing it. In this way, at least, a
task of philosophy can be performed in a medium of popular culture.38
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Gracia for comments on an earlier version of this paper, and Kelly A.
Wilson for her efforts in pulling me inside the world of comic books.
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